



सी डैक  
CDAC



International Conference  
on  
PKI and Its Applications  
(PKIA-2017)  
November 14-15, 2017

Hotel Chancery Pavilion, Bangalore



# MALSIGN: THREAT ANALYSIS OF SIGNED AND IMPLICITLY TRUSTED MALICIOUS CODE

Soumajit Pal, Prabakaran Poornachandran, Manu R Krishnan,  
Prem Sankar AU, Parvathy Sasikala

Amrita Center for Cyber Security  
Amrita University, Kerala



[www.pkiindia.in](http://www.pkiindia.in)



[www.facebook.com/pkiindia](https://www.facebook.com/pkiindia)



[PKIIndia](https://www.youtube.com/PKIIndia)




[@pkiindia](https://twitter.com/pkiindia)

# Signed Malware?

Image reference: [1]

Total Malicious Signed Binaries



Signed Binaries. Are all of them benign ?

# Signed Malware contd...

Image reference: [2,3,4]

✓ Symantec Official Blog

## Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates

A China-based APT group has an insatiable appetite for stolen code-signing

By: **Jon DiMaggio** SYMANTEC EMPLOYEE

Created 15 Mar 2016 | 0 Comments | 简体中文, 繁體中文, 日本語

g+ 0 | in 268 | twitter ✓ Symantec Official Blog

## Opera Breach - When Cybercriminals take on Targeted Attacks

By: **Symantec Security Response** SYMANTEC EMPLOYEE

Created 28 Jun 2013 | 0 Comments | 日本語

g+ 0 | in 6 | twitter | Like 0

On June 26 2013, browser manufacturer Opera announced that they had been breached as a result against their infrastructure. However, this was no ordinary targeted attack. The attackers in this case steal intellectual property. They wanted to use Opera's auto-update mechanism in order to propagate malware normally associated with financial Trojans.

### Information Stealer - Trojan Spymel

The downloaded malware executable is a highly obfuscated .NET binary, which is digitally signed with a certificate issued to "SBO INVEST". The certificate was promptly revoked by DigiCert when notified and, therefore, is not active in any attack. We noticed a newer variant arose within two weeks of the first variant, using another certificate issued to "SBO INVEST" that is also revoked.



# Code Signing Infrastructure: Threats

---

- CA side:
  - Issuing certificates to malicious groups
    - Fake companies, domains
    - VeriSign issued signing certificate to fake Microsoft employee
  - Erroneous Certificate Issue
    - TURKTRUST
    - Intermediary SSL certificates
  - Reseller Account (RA) Proxy Partner Breach
    - Commodo CA
  - Insecure Management of CA's Private Key

# Code Signing Infrastructure: Threats ...

- Software Provider side:
  - Insecure Infrastructure
    - Expired Opera Certificate
    - Downloader Trojan as valid Update
  - Signing unclean code
    - Adobe, compromised build server
  - Self-signed Certificates
- Client side:
  - Improper Verification of certificate
    - Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
  - User Ignorance

# Meanwhile Ccleaner: “signed malware”

Monday, September 18, 2017

Security Notification for CCleaner v5.33.6162 and CCleaner Cloud v1.07.3191 for 32-bit Windows users



- Compromised build server owned by Piriform ltd.
- Self-signed certificate for first stage of the attack.
- Infected app signed by valid Symantec certificate.
- Reported September 18, 2017



PAUL YUNG  
VP, Products

Dear CCleaner customers, users and supporters,

We would like to apologize for a security incident that we have recently found in CCleaner version 5.33.6162 and CCleaner Cloud version 1.07.3191. A suspicious activity was identified on September 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017, where we saw an unknown IP address receiving data from software found in version 5.33.6162 of CCleaner, and CCleaner Cloud version 1.07.3191, on 32-bit Windows systems. Based on further analysis, we found that the 5.33.6162 version of CCleaner and


Image reference: [5]

# Tale of Signed Software Updates

---


- Implicitly trusted by AV software.
- Impacted companies like Adobe, Opera ...
- Prevention mechanism?
  - Additional Security Layer
    - Works with any software update process

# Secure Layer for Secure Software Updates




# Secure Layer for Secure Software Updates

- Step 1:



# Secure Layer for Secure Software Updates

- Step 2: Security Layer



# Conclusion

---

- Impacts are manifold
  - Trust
  - Economy
  - Society
- Our model adds additional out-of-band verification which works with typical software update procedure.





 **IEEE**  
PKIA-2017

# Thank You

सी डैक  
CDAC

 [www.pkiindia.in](http://www.pkiindia.in)

 [www.facebook.com/pkiindia](https://www.facebook.com/pkiindia)

 [PKIIndia](https://www.youtube.com/PKIIndia)

 [@pkiindia](https://twitter.com/pkiindia)